A heuristic process for local inconsistency diagnosis in firewall rule sets by Pozo Hidalgo, Sergio et al.
A Heuristic Process for Local Inconsistency 
Diagnosis in Firewall Rule Sets
1
 
 
S. Pozo 
Department of Computer Languages and Systems, Computer Engineering High School, University of Seville, Spain 
Email: sergiopozo@us.es 
 
R. Ceballos, R.M. Gasca 
Department of Computer Languages and Systems, Computer Engineering High School, University of Seville, Spain 
Email: {ceball,gasca}@us.es 
 
 
Abstract— Writing and managing firewall ACLs are hard 
and error-prone tasks for a wide range of reasons. During 
these tasks, inconsistent rules can be introduced. An 
inconsistent firewall ACL implies in general a design error, 
and indicates that the firewall is accepting traffic that 
should be denied or vice versa. However, the administrator 
is who ultimately decides if an inconsistent rule is a fault or 
not. Although many algorithms to diagnose inconsistencies 
in firewall ACLs have been proposed, they have different 
drawbacks regarding many aspects of the consistency 
management problem, which can prevent their use in a wide 
range of real-life situations. The most important one is that 
they give complete and minimal results, but their 
algorithmic complexity is too high, making the problem 
intractable for even reasonably-sized ACLs. In this paper 
we present an analysis of the consistency diagnosis problem 
in firewall ACLs. Based on this analysis, we propose to split 
the process in several parts that can be solved sequentially: 
inconsistency detection and isolation, inconsistent rules 
identification, and inconsistency characterization. Our 
algorithms are the first which can solve the detection, 
isolation, and identification problems in quadratic time 
complexity, giving complete but not necessarily minimal 
results. A theoretical complexity analysis as well as 
experimental results with real ACLs is given.  
 
Index Terms— diagnosis, consistency, conflict, anomaly, 
firewall, acl, ruleset 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Your goal is to simulate the usual appearance of papers 
in a Journal of the Academy Publisher. We are requesting 
that you follow these guidelines as closely as possible. 
A firewall is a network element that controls the 
traversal of packets across different network segments. It 
is a mechanism to enforce an Access Control Policy, 
represented as an Access Control List (ACL). Firewalls 
use obligation policies. Obligation policies can be 
represented as Event Condition Action Rules (ECA 
Rules) that must perform certain actions over a subject (in 
the firewall case, the subject is always traffic) when 
certain events occur. Thus, a layer 3 Firewall ACL is in 
general a list of linearly ordered (total order) 
condition/action rules. The condition part of a rule is a set 
of condition attributes or selectors. The condition set is 
typically composed of five elements, which correspond to 
five fields of a packet header [14]. Some of these 
selectors can be expressed as naturals, and others as both 
naturals and intervals of naturals. In firewalls, the process 
of matching TCP/IP packets against rules is called 
filtering. A rule matches a packet when the values of each 
field of the header of a packet are subsets or equal to the 
values of its corresponding rule selector. The action part 
of the rule represents the action that should be taken for a 
matching packet. In firewalls, two actions are possible: 
allow or deny a packet. A firewall ACL is commonly 
denominated a rule set.  
Writing ACLs is a time-consuming and error-prone 
task for several reasons [16]. One of the main ones is that 
networks have different access control requirements (or 
objectives) which must be translated by a network 
administrator into firewall ACLs. The gap between the 
high-level access control requirements and low-level 
ACLs is too wide. Low-level firewall languages are, in 
general, difficult to learn, use and understand, and are 
very different from each other in syntax and semantics. 
Although many high-level languages have been proposed 
in order to reduce design complexity and (thus design 
faults), node of them have been widely adopted by the 
industry for various reasons [2]. In addition, its use does 
not guarantee that the resulting ACL is fault-free, thus a 
method to diagnose design faults must be applied in order 
to correct them prior to ACL deployment. 
 
1 This paper is a revised and extended version of a paper published 
in SECRYPT 2008 [11]. 
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Furthermore, complexity of networks is constantly 
increasing, as changes in requirements, topology, etc. 
occur with higher frequency and density. According to 
Taylor [14], the number of rules in a firewall ACL 
usually ranges between a few ones and five thousand. For 
this reason, the management of firewall ACLs is also a 
very hard task. For example, changing from one firewall 
platform to another often means a complete rewrite of the 
ACL, and thus new faults can be introduced. In addition, 
ACL updates can also introduce new design faults [10]. 
One of the most important and frequent faults during 
ACL design and management are inconsistencies. A 
firewall ACL with inconsistent rules implies in general 
design faults, and indicates that the firewall is accepting 
traffic that should be denied or vice versa. This can result 
in severe problems such as unwanted accesses to services, 
denial of service, overflows, etc. ACL consistency is of 
extreme importance in several contexts, such as highly 
sensitive applications (e.g. health care). Thus, algorithms 
and tools to automatically isolate and characterize 
inconsistencies must be provided in order to give firewall 
administrator enough information to correct them and 
reduce the number of faults in firewall ACLs. 
Many algorithms to diagnose inconsistencies in 
firewall ACLs have been proposed, and in all of them is 
the firewall administrator who ultimately decides which 
rules have to be corrected. However, these algorithms 
have many drawbacks regarding different aspects of the 
consistency management problem. The most important 
one is that they pre-process the firewall ACL using 
different types of non-trivial decompositions in order to 
use more efficient abstract data types and techniques. 
However, the proposed decomposition techniques 
increase the number of rules in the ACL and have worst-
case exponential time and space complexity. As a 
consequence, results of these consistency management 
algorithms are given over the modified ACL, and have to 
be interpreted by the firewall administrator. Furthermore, 
their time and space complexity is very important, since 
these algorithms are being used in a new range of 
applications in resource-constrained devices in ubiquitous 
networks, such as ad-hoc network node real-time ACL 
updates [10], real-time IDS or IPS rule updates, etc. 
 
In this paper we propose to take a different approach in 
order to make the problem tractable for real-life, big rule 
sets. We propose to divide consistency diagnosis in three 
sequential steps (Fig. 1). This paper focuses in the first 
two parts of the process (detection and isolation, and 
identification). In this paper, we propose best case O(n) 
and worst case O(n
2
) time complexity order independent 
detection and isolation, and identification algorithms with 
the number of rules of the rule set, n. Algorithms are 
capable of handling full ranges in rule selectors without 
doing rule decorrelation, range to prefix conversion, or 
any other pre-process. Results are returned over the 
original unmodified ACL. The process does not cope 
with redundancies, as we consider redundancy diagnosis 
a different problem because redundancies do not change 
the ACL semantics, but only affect the performance of 
the matching algorithm, which is not the focus of this 
paper. 
This paper is structured as follows. In section II, we 
analyze the internals of the local consistency management 
problem in firewall rule sets and formalize it. In section 
III we propose the consistency-based diagnosis 
algorithms, give a theoretical complexity analysis and 
experimental results with real rule sets, which validate 
our proposal. In section IV we review related works 
comparing them to our proposal. Finally we give some 
concluding remarks in section V. 
II.  ANALYSIS OF THE CONSISTENCY PROBLEM 
To understand the problem, it is important to first 
review the inconsistencies characterized in the 
bibliography. A complete characterization that includes 
shadowing, generalization, correlation and redundancy 
has been given in [6]. Although all of these are 
inconsistencies, usually not all are considered to be 
design faults, as they can be used to cause desirable 
effects. Is the firewall administrator who ultimately 
decides which rules have to be corrected or removed. 
 
 
Figure 1. Consistency diagnosis process 
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Figure 2. Graphical representation of three inconsistencies 
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These inconsistencies except redundancy are graphically 
presented in Fig. 2. For the sake of simplicity, only pair 
wise inconsistencies with one selector are represented. 
An example of an ACL is presented in Table 1. 
In this paper, we propose to divide consistency 
management in three sequential steps (Fig. 1). At the first 
step, all rules that cause inconsistencies are detected and 
isolated, if any. Then, the set of rules that cause the 
detected inconsistencies should be identified. Their 
correction or removal guarantees that the resulting rule 
set is consistent. This set of identified rules must be as 
small as possible, in order to give useful results in rule 
sets with a high number of inconsistencies. These two 
steps are called Inconsistency Diagnosis. Finally, the 
identified inconsistent rules should be characterized 
among an established taxonomy of firewall rule set 
inconsistencies. This paper is focused in these two parts 
of the consistency diagnosis problem. The third and last 
problem, minimal inconsistency characterization, is 
combinatorial [12]. Furthermore, diagnosis is also rule-
order independent, contrarily to characterization. The 
main difference of this work with other ones is that other 
authors apply brute force algorithms to solve directly the 
characterization problem, with no previous diagnosis. 
This yields algorithms that cannot be applied to big rule 
sets. With the proposed approach, the same 
characterization algorithms can be applied to several 
smaller problems, rather than to the full rule set. 
However, the number of these smaller problems is not 
minimal with the heuristic algorithms proposed in this 
paper. In addition, heuristic characterization algorithms 
[12] can also be used to give approximate results in a 
reasonable time, even for really big rule sets (with more 
than 10000 rules). 
A.  1..1 and 1..n Consistency in Firewall Rule Sets 
First, it is needed to formalize a firewall rule set. 
• Let RS be a firewall rule set consisting of n rules, 
{ }
1
, ...
n
RS R R= . 
• Let 
5
, ,R H Action H=< > ∈ℕ  be a rule, where 
{ },Action allow deny=  is its action. 
• Let [ ],1 ,
j
R k j n k≤ ≤ ∈   
{ }, _ , _ , _ , _protocol src ip src prt dst ip dst prt  be a 
selector of a firewall rule Rj. 
• Let ‘<’ and ‘>’ be operators defined over the priority 
of the rules, where Rx < Ry implies that then Rx has 
more priority than Ry and its action is going to be 
taken first, and vice versa. 
 
Attending to Al-Shaer characterization, two rules (Rx, 
Ry) are correlated if they have a relation between all of its 
selectors, and have different actions. Fig. 2(c) represents 
a correlation inconsistency between two rules with one 
selector each. As the figure shows, the relation between 
the rules is not subset, nor superset, nor equal (rules R1 
and R3 of Table 1 are correlated). Fig. 2(a) represents a 
shadowing inconsistency between two rules. The relation 
is equality or subset of the shadowed rule, Ry, respect to 
the general rule, Rx, with Rx>Ry (R4 is shadowed by R3 in 
Table 1 example). Fig. 2(b) represents a generalization 
inconsistency between two rules, which is the inverse of 
shadowing respect to the priority of the rules. The 
relation is superset of the general rule respect to the other 
one (R2 is a generalization of R3 in Table 1 example). 
Since we are only interested in diagnosis and not in its 
characterization, let’s try to remove names and give a 
general case of inconsistency based on these 
inconsistency characterizations (except redundancy). In a 
closer look at shadowing and generalization 
inconsistencies in Fig. 2, it can be seen that, in reality, 
these two inconsistencies are the same one, and the only 
thing that differentiates them is the priority of the rules. 
Thus, if priority is ignored, these two inconsistencies are 
special cases of a correlation. That is, shadowing can be 
redefined as a correlation where all selectors of one rule 
(the shadowed one) are subsets or equal of the general 
rule. As generalization is the inverse with respect to the 
priority of shadowing, a generalization inconsistency can 
also be redefined as a correlation where of all selectors of 
a rule (the general one) are supersets of the other rule. So, 
the correlation inconsistency can be redefined as the 
superset of all inconsistencies, representing the most 
general case. For that reasons, it is possible to define rule 
inconsistency in only one priority independent case that 
TABLE 1: EXAMPLE OF A FIREWALL RULE SET 
 
Priority/ID Protocol Source IP Src Port Destination IP Dst Port Action 
R1 tcp 192.168.1.5/32 any *.*.*.*/0 80 deny 
R2 tcp 192.168.1.*/24 any *.*.*.*/0 80 allow 
R3 tcp *.*.*.*/0 any 172.0.1.10/32 80 allow 
R4 tcp 192.168.1.*/24 any 172.0.1.10/32 80 deny 
R5 tcp 192.168.1.60/32 any *.*.*.*/0 21 deny 
R6 tcp 192.168.1.*/24 any *.*.*.*/0 21 allow 
R7 tcp 192.168.1.*/24 any 172.0.1.10/32 21 allow 
R8 tcp *.*.*.*/0 any *.*.*.*/0 any deny 
R9 udp 192.168.1.*/24 any 172.0.1.10/32 53 allow 
R10 udp *.*.*.*/0 any 172.0.1.10/32 53 allow 
R11 udp 192.168.2.*/24 any 172.0.2.*/24 any allow 
R12 udp *.*.*.*/0 any *.*.*.*/0 any deny 
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recognizes all characterized inconsistencies (Axiom 
2.1.1). This is a key issue for the proposed diagnosis 
algorithms. 
  
Axiom 2.1.1. Rule inconsistency. Two rules 
,
i j
R R RS∈  are inconsistent if and only if the 
intersection of each of all of its selectors R[k] is not 
empty, and they have different actions, independently of 
their priorities. The inconsistency between two rules 
expresses the possibility of an undesirable effect in the 
semantics of the rule set. The inconsistency is considered 
to be a fault if an administrator identifies the behaviour of 
the executed ACL as being causing undesirable effects 
(or having errors). The semantics of the rule set changes 
if an inconsistent rule is corrected or removed. 
 
{ }
( , ) 1 1 ,
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
, _ , _ , _ , _
, ,
i j i j
i j
Inconsistent R RS i n R RS j n j i
R k R k R Action R Action
k protocol src ip src prt dst ip dst prt
≤ ≤ ⇔ ∃ ∈ ≤ ≤ ≠ •
≠ ∅ ∧ ≠
∀ ∈
∩  
Inconsistency of one rule in a RS 
 
{ }
( , , ) 1 , ,
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
, _ , _ , _ , _
,
i j i j
i j
Inconsistent R R RS i j n i j
R k R k R Action R Action
k protocol src ip src prt dst ip dst prt
≤ ≤ ≠ ⇔
≠ ∅ ∧ ≠
∀ ∈
∩  
Inconsistency between two rules in a RS 
 
Attending to Axiom 2.1.1, all cases represented in Fig. 
2 are of the same kind, and are called inconsistencies 
without any particular characterization. As it has been 
demonstrated in the proof, rule priorities are not required 
to detect inconsistencies.  
Axiom 2.1.1 can also be used for more than two rules, 
since the case of one to n rule inconsistency can be 
decomposed in several independent pair wise 
inconsistencies (Lemma 2.1.1). 
 
Lemma 2.1.1. Axiom 2.1.1 can be extended to capture 
inconsistencies between one and more than one rules  
(that is 1..n inconsistencies), because a 1..n inconsistency 
can always be decomposed in n 1..1 inconsistencies. 
Proof. Let us reason by contradiction. Suppose there is 
a 1..n inconsistency between a rule Rz and a set of rules 
R1..Rn, that is Inconsistent(Rz, R1..Rn, RS)=true. Suppose 
that this 1..n inconsistency cannot be decomposed in n 
1..1 inconsistencies. If that inconsistency exists, then the 
rules R1..Rn are consistent between them (they must have 
the same action, or in other case Rz could not be 
inconsistent with the whole set of rules). For that reason, 
all selectors of each rule of the R1..Rn set, must 
necessarily intersect with Rz selectors. Thus, Rz must 
necessarily be inconsistent with all of them in an 
independent manner. Note that if the rules in the R1..Rn 
set overlap or not between them is not important, since 
this could indicate a partial or total redundancy between 
one or more rules in the set. 
 
For example, all base situations are presented in Fig. 3, 
which is an extension to Fig. 2. This figure is a 
simplification to three inconsistent rules, but can easily be 
extended to more rules that can be composed in several 
ways. 
Fig. 3(a1) represents an inconsistency where the union 
of two independent rules (Rx, Ry) overlap with another 
one, Rz (Fig. 4(a) taken from [5] exemplifies this 
situation). As Rx is inconsistent with Rz, and Ry is also 
inconsistent with Rz, both in an independent manner, this 
situation can be decomposed in two independent 
inconsistencies. 
 Fig. 3(a2) presents a similar situation, where Rx 
overlaps with the union of (Ry, Rz). This situation is also 
decomposable in two independent inconsistencies: Rx 
Inconsistent with Ry, and Rx with Rz. Note that, in order 
to diagnose inconsistencies, the priority of the rules is not 
necessary. 
 
{ } { }
{ } { }
{ } { }
: [10 50]
: [40 90]
: [30 80]
Rx port allow
Ry port allow
Rz port deny
∈ − ⇒
∈ − ⇒
∈ − ⇒
 
(a) 
{ } { }
{ } { }
{ } { }
: [10 50]
: [40 90]
: [0 100]
Ry port allow
Rz port allow
Rx port deny
∈ − ⇒
∈ − ⇒
∈ − ⇒
 
(b) 
{ } { }
{ } { }
{ } { }
: [0 50]
: [60 100]
: [40 70]
Rx port deny
Rz port deny
Ry port allow
∈ − ⇒
∈ − ⇒
∈ − ⇒
 
(c) 
 
Figure 4.  Inconsistency examples 
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Figure 3. Graphical representation of inconsistencies 
between three rules 
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 The situations presented in Fig. 3(b1) and Fig. 3(b2) 
are the inverse of the two previous ones respect to the 
action. Thus, the decomposition is analogous. This 
situation is exemplified in Fig. 4(b). Finally, Fig. 3(c) 
represents a relation with three overlapping rules (an 
example is in Fig. 4(c)). This situation can also be 
decomposed in two independent ones: Rx inconsistent 
with Ry, and Ry with Rz. 
At this point, we propose a formalization and an 
extension of the fault characterization provided by Al-
Shaer in order to recognize 1..n inconsistencies. The 
proposed fault characterization is also complete (as it is 
an extension of Al-Shaer work) based on the relationships 
that can be established between the selectors of rules: 
equality, subset and superset.  
 
• Shadow. A rule Ry is shadowed by another rule Rx, 
with Rx>Ry, if all of its selectors to or supersets of 
the selectors of Ry, and Rx and Ry have different 
actions.  
 
{ }
( )
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
, _ , _ , _ , _
,
x y x y y
y x x y
R R RS R R Shadow R
k R k R k R Action R Action
k protocol src ip src prt dst ip dst prt
⊂
∃ ∈ > • ⇔
∀ • ∧ ≠
∈
•
 
Shadow 
 
{ }
( )
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
, _ , _ , _ , _
,
x y x y y
y x x y
R R RS R R ExactShadow R
k R k R k R Action R Action
k protocol src ip src prt dst ip dst prt
=
∃ ∈ > • ⇔
∀ • ∧ ≠
∈
•
 
Exact shadow 
 
This definition can be extended to support a set of 
rules with the same action in Rx or Ry (but not in both). If 
Rx is a set of rules and Ry is a rule, then Ry is shadowed by 
Rx. Similarly, if Rx is a rule, and Ry is a set, then Ry are 
shadowed by Rx.  
 
• Generalization. It is the inverse of shadow respect to 
the priority. A rule Ry is a generalization of Rx, with 
Rx>Ry, if all of the selectors of Rx are subsets of the 
selectors of Ry, and both rules have different actions. 
Rx is usually considered an exception and not a fault. 
Again, sets can be formed. 
 
{ }
( )
[ ] [ ]
, _ , _ , _ , _
,
x y x y y
y x x y
R R RS R R Generalization R
k R R R Action R Action
k protocol src ip src prt dst ip dst prt
∃ ∈ > • ⇔
∀ • ⊃ ∧ ≠
∈
•
 
 
• Correlation. Two rules Rx and Ry are correlated if they 
have different actions, and selectors of Rx intersect 
with the corresponding selectors of Ry, but Rx and Ry 
do not have a shadow, exact shadow or 
generalization relation. Correlation is independent of 
rule priority. This definition can also be extended to 
sets of rules. 
 
{ }
( )
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
( [ ] [ ]) ( [ ] [ ])
, _ , _ , _ , _
,
x y x y
x y x y
x y x y
R R RS Correlation R R
k R k R k R Action R Action
R k R k R k R k
k protocol src ip src prt dst ip dst prt
∃ ∈ • ⇔
∀ • ∧ ≠ ∧
¬ ⊆ ∧ ¬ ⊃
∈
∩
 
 
Note that inconsistencies that could be generated 
during rule set updates (removals, insertions, and 
modifications) is a topic not covered in this paper, but has 
been covered in another work [10]. 
III.  CONSISTENCY-BASED DIAGNOSIS OF RULE SETS 
The presented analysis has motivated the separation of 
characterization from diagnosis, and to solve the 
diagnosis problem as a first step for the optimal 
inconsistency characterization problem. As it is going to 
be shown, the result of the diagnosis process is the 
identification of a set of rules that cause the 
inconsistencies in the rule set and for each one, the set of 
the rules which they are inconsistent with. Each of these 
sets and their corresponding identified conflicting rule 
can be taken as input to the characterization part of the 
process, resulting in an effective computational 
complexity reduction (solving several small 
combinatorial problems is faster than solving a big one). 
However, as the proposed algorithm for the identification 
of inconsistent rules is not minimal, the application of an 
optimal characterization algorithm to its result may be 
senseless. In contrast, heuristic characterization 
algorithms [12] can be used, with a big improvement in 
computational complexity for  the full process. 
In this section, two algorithms which implement 
Axiom 2.1.1 and Lemma 2.1.1 and the diagnosis process 
explained in the previous section are presented. 
Algorithms are capable of handling ranges in all selectors 
without modifications to the input rule set.  
A.  Step 1. Detection and Isolation of Inconsistent Pairs 
of Rules 
The first step of the process detects the inconsistent 
rules of the rule set and returns an Inconsistency Graph 
(IG, Definition 3.1.1) representing their relations. Note 
that the detection and isolation process, like Axiom 2.1.1, 
is order independent. Also note that the presented 
algorithm is complete, as it implements Axiom 2.1.1 
(which is complete). 
 
Definition 3.1.1. Inconsistency Graph, IG. An IG is 
an undirected, cyclic and disconnected graph whose 
vertices are the inconsistent rules of the rule set, and 
whose edges are the inconsistency relations between the 
inconsistent rules. Note that |IG| is the number of 
inconsistent rules in RS, and ||IG|| corresponds to the 
number of inconsistencies pairs of rules in RS, or simply 
the number of inconsistencies in RS. 
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 Algorithm 1 presented in Fig. 5 (implemented in 
Object Oriented paradigm and using abstract data types)  
exploits the order independence of the inconsistency 
axiom and only checks inconsistencies between rules 
with different actions, dividing the ACL in two lists, one 
with allow rules and the other with deny ones. The 
algorithm receives two rule sets. One of them consist of 
allow rules and the other of deny rules of the original rule 
set. This decomposition is trivial and runs in linear 
complexity with the number of rules in RS. The algorithm 
takes one of the rule sets and, for each rule, it checks if 
there is an inconsistency with other rules in the other one. 
As all inconsistencies can be decomposed in two by two 
relations, there is no need to check combinations of more 
than two rules. Each time the algorithm finds an 
inconsistency between a pair of rules, the two rules are 
added as vertices to the IG, with a non directed edge 
between them. The algorithm returns ends returning the 
IG. Since all possibilities have been checked, Algorithm 
1 returns the isolation of all possible inconsistent rules 
(i.e. it is complete). Fig. 6 presents the resulting IG of the 
Table 1 example. 
Time complexity of Algorithm 1 is bounded by the two 
nested loops (lines 7 and 9). Each rule in ruleSetAllow is 
tested for inconsistency against rules in ruleSetDeny. The 
worst case for the loop is reached when 
ruleSetAllow.size()= ruleSetDeny.size() (i.e. half rules 
allow and the other half deny), and the best case when 
ruleSetAllow.size()=n and ruleSetDeny.size()=1 or 
ruleSetAllow.size()=1 and ruleSetDeny.size()=n. Thus, 
the complexity of the improved isolation algorithm 
depends on the percentage of allow and deny rules over 
the total number of rules. 
However, there are other inner operations that should 
be analyzed in lines 11 to 14. The first one, in line 11, is 
inconsistency() which is composed of an iteration. This 
operation implements the inconsistency lemma. In typical 
firewall ACLs, k=5, and thus the iteration runs 5 times. 
Anyway, the iteration is bounded by the number of 
selectors, which is always a constant k. 
In addition, inside the iteration there is an intersection 
between each selector (lines 28 to 30). The typical 5 
selectors of firewall ACLs (Table 1) are integers or 
intervals of integers. Knowing if two ranges of integers 
intersect can be done in constant time with a trivial 
algorithm which compares the limits of the intervals. 
Knowing if two IP addresses intersect can also be easily 
done in constant time by comparing their network 
addresses and netmasks. Other operations of the inner 
loop (lines 12 to 14) are the graph-related ones. If the 
graph is based on hash tables, vertex and edge insertions 
run in constant time, except in some cases where 
rehashing could be necessary.  
For all these reasons, the complexity of the two nested 
loops is only affected by a constant factor in all cases, 
which depends on the number of selectors, k. Thus, worst 
case time complexity of the isolation algorithm is in 
O(n
2
), best case is in O(n), and  average case is in O(n·m) 
with the number of allow rules, n, and deny rules, m in 
the ACL. 
Algorithm 1. Inconsistency Detection and Isolation 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
Func detection(in List: ruleSetAllow, ruleSetDeny; 
out Graph: ig) 
Var 
    Rule ri, rj 
    Integer i, j 
Alg 
    for each j=1..ruleSetAllow.size() { 
        rj= ruleSetAllow.get(j) 
        for each i=1..ruleSetDeny.size() { 
            ri = ruleSetDeny.get(i) 
            if (inconsistency(ri, rj)) { 
                ig.addVertex(ri) 
                ig.addVertex(rj) 
                ig.addEdge(ri, rj) 
            } 
        } 
    } 
End Alg 
 
// Implements the Inconsistency Definition 
Func inconsistency(in Rule: rx, ry; out Boolean: b) 
Var 
    Integer i 
Alg 
    b = true 
    i = 1 
    while (i<=rx.selectors.size() AND b) 
        b = b AND intersection(rx.getSelector(i),  
                                               ry.getSelector(i)) 
        i=i+1 
    } 
End Alg 
 
Figure 5. Inconsistency detection algorithm 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Inconsistency graph 
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Space used by Algorithm 1 is the sum of the space 
needed to store the ACL, and the one needed for the 
graph. In best case the graph would have n vertices and n-
1 edges. In the worst case, there could be n-1 inconsistent 
rules and also n-1 edges per vertex. Note that the space 
needed to store an edge is fewer than the needed to store 
a vertex, since only a reference between vertices is 
needed. 
B.  Identification of Inconsistent Rules 
The second and last step of the diagnosis process 
identifies the set of rules that cause the inconsistencies 
from the isolated set of inconsistent pairs of rules (the 
result of the previous step) with a heuristic algorithm. 
Algorithm 2 (Fig. 7) was initially presented in [9]. It 
receives the IG as input and takes iteratively the vertex 
with the greatest number of adjacencies (lines 6 and 7), 
that is, the vertex with the greatest number of 
inconsistencies, v. Then, an independent cluster of 
inconsistent rules (ICIR, Definition 3.2.1) is created as a 
tree with v (the conflicting rule of the cluster) as its root, 
and its adjacents (the inconsistent rules) as leaves (lines 7 
to 11). The root of all ICIRs form the Diagnosis Set (DS, 
Definition 3.2.2), or the set of rules that must be removed 
to get a consistent rule set. Then, v and its edges are 
removed from the IG (line 13). If vertices with no edges 
are left in the IG, then these vertices are also removed 
(line 14), since they are consistent by definition (they are 
rules with no relations with others). As inconsistencies 
have been decomposed in pair wise relations, ICIRs are 
always formed by two levels. 
 
Definition 3.2.1. Independent Cluster of 
Inconsistent Rules, ICIR. An ICIR(root, CV) is a two 
level tree, rooted in the rule root and where CV is a set of 
rules (its leaves). It represents a cluster of mutually 
consistent rules, CV, which are at the same time 
inconsistent with their respective root. ICIR(root) is the 
rule which has the greatest number of inconsistencies 
with other rules of the same cluster. For that reason, the 
root of each ICIR is different, and all roots form a 
disjoint set of rules. Note that the action ICIR(root) is the 
contrary of the actions of all of its leaves in CV.  
 
( , )
( , )
, , ( , )
i i
i j i j
ICIR root CV
R CV Inconsistent root R
R R CV i j Inconsistent R R
⇔
∀ ∈ • ∧
∀ ∈ ≠ •¬
 
 
Definition 3.2.2. Diagnosis Set, DS. This is the set of 
rules that cause the inconsistencies, and coincide with the 
root of all ICIRs. If these inconsistencies are removed 
from RS, RS becomes consistent. 
 
{ }
{ }
1
1
, ...,
( ), ..., ( )
 -  is consistent
Let 
be the set of all ICIR of a given , then
m
m
ICIR ICIR
DS ICIR root ICIR root
RS DS
ICIRS
RS
=
=
•
 
 A graphical representation of a partial trace of 
Algorithm 2 over the previous IG is presented in Fig. 8. 
At the first iteration, R8 is selected because it has four 
inconsistencies (the greatest number of adjacent vertices). 
Then, it is removed and the first ICIR tree is formed with 
R8 as root, thus R8 is a conflicting rule and will be in DS. 
At the second iteration, R12 is selected because it has 
three inconsistencies (it is the vertex with the biggest 
number of adjacent vertices). Then it is removed and the 
second ICIR is formed. Vertices R9, R10 and R11 are also 
removed from the IG because they had no adjacent 
vertices. At the third iteration, there is a possibility of 
selecting R5, R1, R2, R3 and R4 as the next vertex. The 
selection of one or other is arbitrary. In this example, the 
algorithm selects R5, removes it from the IG with all its 
edges and forms the third ICIR. At the end of this 
iteration the IG is only composed of a cycle of four 
vertices: R1, R2, R3, and R4. The algorithm selects to 
remove R1 at the fourth iteration and R4 at the fifth and 
last one, removing the vertices and edges, and forming 
ICIR 4 and ICIR 5 respectively. Since no more vertices 
are left in the IG, the algorithm finishes with a diagnosis 
set with cardinality five, containing the rules DS={R8, 
R12, R5, R1, R4}. 
If the rules from the DS are removed from RS, RS 
becomes consistent.  
 
It has been noted in the explanation of the trace that at 
some time, the IG could have cycles. Cycles have a 
special property. In a cycle, the selection of a rule as the 
next to be processed is random, since all of them have the 
same number of adjacent vertices. Depending on the rule 
that is selected, the algorithm forms different ICIRs. In 
this example, R1 and then R4 have been selected but if for 
example, R2 and R3 were selected, different ICIRs would 
have been formed (Fig. 9). The final number of ICIRs 
formed is always the same in this special case, since the 
number of vertices and edges removed is the same with 
independency of the actual vertices removed from a 
cycle. Most important fact is that the two groups of ICIRs 
Algorithm 2. Inconsistent Rule Identification  
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
Func identification(in Graph:ig; out List of 
Tree:icirs) 
Var 
    Tree icir 
Alg 
    while (ig.hasVertices()) { 
        Vertex v = ig.getMaxAdjacencyVertex(); 
        List adj = ig.getAdjacents(v) 
        icir.createEmptyTree() 
        icir.setRoot(v) 
        icir.addChildren(adj) 
        icirs.add(icir) 
        ig.removeVertexWithEdges(v) 
        ig.removeNotConnectedVertices() 
    } 
End Alg 
 
Figure 7: Inconsistency identification algorithm 
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are equivalent, since the rules involved in the 
inconsistencies are the same, only its order has changed. 
This property of cycles is derived from the fact that all 
the rules in a cycle are correlated between themselves. 
For example, R1 appears in ICIR 4b and 5b, because R1 is 
correlated with both roots R2 and R3. Looking at ICIR 4a, 
the relations are ICIR4a={root=R1, R2, R3}, which is 
formed of that three rules. 
 
Time complexity of Algorithm 2 is bounded by the 
loop of line 5, which runs as many times as ICIRs are 
formed (it corresponds with the cardinality of the 
Diagnosis Set, |DS|). The worst case is reached, as in 
Algorithm 1, when 
ruleSetAllow.size()=ruleSetDeny.size()=n/2 (Fig. 10(b)), 
resulting in a |DS|=n/2. In this case, 
getMaxAdjacencyVertex() (line 7), a maximum calculus, 
runs in O(n) with the number of vertices of the graph (the 
number of inconsistencies). Operations of lines 8, 9, 10, 
11, and 12 run in constant time. 
removeVertexWithEdges() (line 13) runs in linear time 
with the cardinality of its adjacency list (n/2-1 in the 
worst case). Finally, removeUnconnectedVertices() (line 
14) is also linear with the number of vertices in the graph 
at each iteration, O(n). Thus, the resulting worst case time 
complexity of Algorithm 2 is in O(|DS|·(n+n/2-
1+n))=O(n/2·n)=O(n
2
). 
The best case is reached, as in Algorithm 1, when 
ruleSetAllow.size()=n and ruleSetDeny.size()=1 or vice 
versa (Fig. 10(a)). The IG only has one vertex, v, 
connected to all the other vertices. In this case, |DS|=1 
and the algorithm is in O(n). In an average case the 
algorithm is in O(|DS|·h), |DS|<<h (h is the number of 
inconsistencies). 
 
 
Figure 8. Partial trace of Algorithm 2 applied to the example IG 
 
Figure 9. Equivalent ICIRs from Fig. 8 It. 3 
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Algorithm 2 needs some space to store the ICIRs. Each 
ICIR needs space for its root and for the conflictive rules. 
But note that, as the algorithm is creating the ICIRs, the 
corresponding vertices and edges are removed from the 
IG, and thus at each iteration only the space to store the 
adjacency list of the removed vertex is necessary. 
Complexities are presented in Table 2. 
The result of the diagnosis process is the set of all 
ICIRs. As each ICIR represents a different independent 
inconsistency, exhaustive search optimal characterization 
algorithms can be applied to each one independently, 
reducing the effective computational complexity of the 
whole process. Furthermore, heuristic characterization 
algorithms can also be applied [12]. Also note that the 
presented proposal makes no assumptions about how 
selector ranges are expressed. This is important, because 
as the original rule set is directly used by algorithms, 
inconsistency results are given over it. 
 
TABLE 2: ISOLATION AND IDENTIFICATION TIME COMPLEXITIES 
 
Number of 
inserted rules 
Best 
case 
Average 
case 
Worst 
case 
Space 
Worst 
Detection and 
Isolation 
O(n) O(n·m) O(n2) 
n Rules· 
h Edges 
Identification O(n) 
O(|DS|·h), 
|DS|<<h 
O(h2) 
n Rules· 
h Edges 
Combined 
(Diagnosis) 
O(n) O(n·m) O(n2+h2) 
n Rules· 
h Edges 
 
C. Experimental Results 
In absence of standard rule sets for testing, the 
proposed heuristic process has been tested with real 
firewall rule sets (Tables 3 and 4). The first column 
represents the size of the rule set; the second one the 
percentage of deny rules over the rule set size; the third 
the cardinality of the Diagnosis Set, |DS|, (or the number 
of generated ICIRs); the fourth represents the average 
size of each ICIR (that is, the number of ICIRs divided by 
|DS|), or the average size of the characterization problems 
to be solved (how many rules are in them); the fifth the 
number of inconsistencies; from sixth to nineth the 
execution time of the isolation and identification parts of 
the process (trivial detection and isolation, proposed 
detection and isolation, identification, and the sum of the 
proposed isolation and identification). Results are 
provided in rule sets with and without wildcard rules 
(WR, deny all and allow all rules). 
The conducted performance analysis represents a wide 
spectrum of cases, with ACLs of sizes ranging from 50 to 
10600 rules, and percentages of allow and deny rules 
ranging from 2% to 65%. Recall that worst case is half 
rules allow and the other half deny. Also note that real 
ACLs have some important differences with synthetically 
generated ones. The most important one is the number of 
deny and allow rules: as real firewall ACLs are usually 
designed with deny all default policy, most rules are 
going to have allow actions. In ACLs designed with 
allow all policy, most rules would have deny actions. 
Also note that as the percentage of allow or deny rules 
decreases, the number of inconsistencies does necessarily 
not, because the number of inconsistencies depends on 
how many rules with different actions intersect. Tests 
have been run with and without WR, in order to know the 
impact these rules have in the complexity of the 
algorithms. However, WR provide no useful information 
to the diagnosis process, since they are inconsistent by 
definition with all rules with the contrary action. The 
result is that the worst case would not normally happen 
for the isolation algorithm in real firewall rule sets, but 
the dependence of the identification algorithm on the 
number of inconsistencies is completely arbitrary and 
thus cannot be predicted (however, note that leaving WR 
in the rule set results in a huge increase of inconsistencies 
because of the reasons stated above). Experiments were 
performed on a monothreaded Java implementation with 
Sun JDK 1.6.0 64-Bit Server VM, on an isolated HP 
Proliant 145G2 (AMD Opteron 275 2.2GHz, 2Gb RAM 
DDR400). Execution times are in milliseconds.  
The experimental efficiency comparison of the 
proposed algorithms with others reviewed is a very 
difficult task for two main reasons. In one hand, there are 
no standard rule sets to be used. In other hand different 
proposals cover different parts of the process (for 
example, Al-Shaer proposal covers the characterization 
part, García-Alfaro proposal the full process, and our 
proposal the diagnosis part). One of the most important 
contributions of the presented experimental analysis is the 
average reduction of the diagnosis characterization 
problem, which is in average |DS|*Average ICIR size. 
Another important contribution is the improvement in 
time of the detection and isolation part of the diagnosis 
process, over the trivial isolation algorithm. 
As Tables 3 and 4 and Fig. 11 show, execution time for 
the full diagnosis process is very reasonable, even in 
large rule sets. Note that rule set of sizes 238 and 450 are 
very near worst case. Rule set of size 10611 has not been 
represented to prevent image scale distortion, but note 
that even with a very high number of inconsistencies w/ 
WR (11866) execution time of the full process is 354ms. 
Take into account that a rule set of 10611 rules is a very 
big one [14].  Tables 3 and 4 and Fig. 11 present a lot of 
information. Note for example in Fig. 11(a) how little the 
performance of isolation between 2500 and 5000 rule set 
sizes differ, because they are very near the best case for 
isolationn (a real rule set could be in the 10-15% range of 
deny rules [14]). Also note that for the worst case of 
isolation (238 and 450 rules in the ACL), running time 
 
 
Figure 10. Identification best and worst cases 
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almost doubles. Take into account that results are 
basically the same with and without WR for the isolation 
algorithm, since the only difference between them is the 
number of removed WR rules, which ranges from two to 
ten in the tested rule sets. Since the size of the problem 
for the isolation algorithm is measured in hundred or 
thousand of rules, removing such a little number of them, 
implies a negligible performance impact. 
However, looking again at Tables 3 and 4 and Fig. 11, 
but for the identification algorithms, other important facts 
should also be explained. This time, complexity is 
bounded by |DS| and the number of inconsistencies. But 
note how the number of reported of inconsistencies varies 
depending on the removal or not of the WR. Now note 
how the performance of identification algorithm degrades 
when number of inconsistencies raise. In fact, leaving 
WR in the rule set, also implies an increase of the 
cardinality of the diagnosis set, |DS| and also of the 
average ICIR sizes. A WR implies that there would be an 
ICIR containing f-1 rules, where f is the number of rules 
with the contrary action of the WR. For example, in the 
rule set with size 10611, a WR with deny action will 
generate an ICIR with 10348 rules, raising the average 
size of the ICIRs. 
In addition, note how complexity is dominated by the 
isolation algorithm, which is the problem with the higher 
theoretic time complexity. The difference between 
leaving and removing WR does not have an important 
impact over the performance of the full process, also 
because this fact (WR does not affect very much the 
performance of the isolation algorithm). 
Other important thing worth noting is related with 
problem reduction. The average ICIR size in Tables 3 and 
4 represents the average number of children of each 
generated ICIR (the number of ICIRs is represented in 
|DS| column). That is, |DS| is the number of 
characterization problems to be optimally solved if 
optimal characterization algorithms are going to be used, 
TABLE 3. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION W/ WR 
ACL 
Size 
%Deny |DS| 
Average 
ICIR 
size 
Number of 
Inconsistencies 
Trivial 
Detection  
(ms) 
Detection  
(ms) 
Identification 
(ms) 
TOTAL 
w/ WR 
(ms) 
50 28.21 2 9 37 0.22 0.09 0.03 0.12 
144 30.91 2 54 108 1.34 0.62 0.06 0.68 
238 66.43 10 23 231 3.56 2.04 0.15 2.19 
450 34.73 10 42 422 13.22 5.61 0.27 5.88 
900 14.8 10 87 871 51.57 3.46 0.73 4.19 
2500 6.97 32 104 3349 387.86 55.01 3.98 58.99 
5000 1.98 6 822 4937 3160.09 64.33 7.90 72.23 
10611 2.05 39 301 11866 12046.67 332.85 21.57 354.42 
 
TABLE 4. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION W/O WR 
ACL 
Size 
%Deny |DS| 
Average 
ICIR 
size 
Number of 
Inconsistencies 
Trivial 
Detection  
(ms) 
Detection  
(ms) 
Identification 
(ms) 
TOTAL 
w/o WR 
(ms) 
46 24.32 0 - 0 0.13 0.07 0 0.07 
140 29.63 0 - 0 1.21 0.53 0 0.53 
228 68.89 8 12 96 3.07 1.88 0.04 1.92 
440 34.97 8 12 96 12.35 5.37 0.04 5.41 
889 14.71 8 12 96 49.58 12.53 0.04 12.57 
2490 6.91 30 34 1020 382.06 51.88 0.76 52.64 
4998 1.94 4 7 34 2231.33 60.84 0.02 60.86 
10601 2.03 37 36 1468 13308.45 310.23 0.85 311.11 
 
 
Figure 11(a). Running time w/o WR Figure 11(b). Running time w/ WR 
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and Average ICIR Size is their average size. Clearly, 
solving (optimally or not) such small number of small 
problems is faster than solving a big combinatorial one 
over the full problem size, n. 
Finally, Fig. 12 presents a comparison between the 
trivial isolation algorithm and the one presented in this 
paper. Note how the trivial algorithm scales quadratically 
with the number of rules. However, the complexity of the 
proposed algorithm depends on the percentage of allow 
and deny rules. As can be seen, there is a huge difference 
with real rule sets. 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Comparison between isolation algorithms 
 
In conclusion, the proposed detection and isolation 
algorithm represents a real improvement over the trivial 
one in real cases. In addition, due to the problem 
reduction due to the proposed consistency diagnosis 
process, exhaustive and optimal identification algorithms 
can be used over the diagnosis result (ICIRs). However 
note that when using heuristics for the diagnosis 
characterization, complexity would in general be 
dominated by the isolation algorithm. For that reason, we 
state that improvements in the isolation algorithm must 
be proposed in the future. It is also possible to use more 
complex heuristics if the final time fits performance 
requirements of the specific application of these 
algorithms. Due to its low computational complexity, the 
presented isolation algorithm can be used with very big 
rule sets or even in resource constrained devices [10] in 
real time. 
IV.  RELATED WORKS 
One of the closest works to ours is related with 
consistency detection and isolation in general network 
filters. In the most recent work, Baboescu et al. [2] 
provides algorithms to detect inconsistencies in router 
filters that are 40 times faster than O(n
2
) ones for the 
general case of k selectors per rule, where n is the number 
of rules in the ACL. Although its algorithmic complexity 
is not given, it improves other previous works of isolation 
algorithms [7], [4]. However, they pre-process the ACL 
and convert selector ranges to prefixes. However, the 
range to prefix conversion technique could need to split a 
range in several prefixes [13] and thus the final number 
of rules could increase over the original ACL. In [14], 
Taylor outlines that this kind of conversion could be 
inefficient, because transport layer specifications vary 
widely (for example it is possible to specify open port 
ranges, such as “all ports greater than 1023”. Taylor also 
calculated that, in the worst case, a range covering w-bit 
port numbers may require 2(w-1) prefixes, and that a 
single ACL including only two port ranges could require 
2(w-1)
2
 entries, or 900 entries (for 16-bit port numbers), 
raising the number of rules needed for the range to prefix 
conversion. Note that the range to prefix conversion is a 
very usual technique used in several matching algorithms. 
However, in diagnosis algorithms, this kind of techniques 
is not suitable. Thus, following Baboescu proposal, 
results are given over the pre-processed ACL, which is 
bigger and different that the original one. 
Other researchers apply brute force, combinatorial 
algorithms to optimally solve the combined diagnosis and 
characterization problems. One of the most important 
advances was made by Al-Shaer et al. [1], where authors 
define an inconsistency model for firewall ACLs with 5 
selectors. They give a combined algorithm to diagnose 
and characterize the inconsistencies between pairs of 
rules. In addition, they use rule decorrelation techniques 
[8] as a pre-process in order to decompose the ACL in a 
new, bigger, one with no overlapping rules. Results are 
given over the decorrelated ACL, which has the 
disadvantages commented for the Baboescu diagnosis 
algorithm. Although the proposed characterization 
algorithm proposed by Al-Shaer is polynomial, a 
decorrelation pre-process imposes a worst case 
exponential time and space complexity for the full 
process. In addition, their algorithms only characterize 
inconsistencies between pairs of rules, providing no 
composition as a later step to get a minimal 
characterization between more than two rules. 
A modification to their algorithms was provided by 
García-Alfaro et al. [5], where they integrate the 
decorrelation and characterization algorithms of Al-
Shaer, and generate a decorrelated and consistent rule set. 
Due to the use of the same decorrelation techniques, this 
proposal also has worst case exponential complexity. The 
resulting ACL is also bigger and different from the 
original one. However, García-Alfaro et al. provides a 
characterization technique with multiple rules. 
Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams (OBDDs) have 
been used in Fireman [15], where authors provide a 
diagnosis and characterization technique with multiple 
rules. A very important improvement over previous 
proposals is that they do not need to decorrelate the ACL, 
and thus, results are given over the original one. Note that 
the complexity of OBDD algorithms depends on the 
optimal ordering of its nodes, which is a NP-Complete 
problem [3]. This results in a worst case exponential time 
complexity with the number of rules, as other proposals. 
There are several differences in our work with respect 
to the reviewed ones. In one hand, we provided an 
analysis of the consistency diagnosis problem in rule sets, 
separating the problem in three parts: detection and 
isolation, identification, and characterization. This 
enabled us to identify the performance bottlenecks of the 
problem, to reduce the combinatorial part 
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(characterization) to several smaller problems, and to 
design heuristic polynomial diagnosis algorithms for 
them if needed. The proposed diagnosis algorithms have 
a theoretical best case O(n) and worst case O(n
2
) time 
complexity with the number of rules in the rule set, n. 
More precisely, the complexity of our algorithms depends 
on the percentage of allow and deny rules over the total 
number of them (in the case of the isolation algorithm), 
on the cardinality of the diagnosis set, and finally, and on 
the number of inconsistencies (in the case of the 
identification algorithm). Our process is capable of 
handling full ranges in all selectors, and does not need to 
decorrelate or do any range to prefix conversion to the 
ACL as a pre-process to the algorithms. We think that for 
a result to be useful for a user, it should be given over the 
original ACL. However, our proposal does not cope with 
redundancies, because we think that redundancies are not 
a consistency problem. 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
We have deeply analyzed the consistency diagnosis 
problem in firewall ACLs, and decided to divide it in 
three sequential steps: detection and isolation, 
identification, and characterization. Detection and 
isolation plus identification is called diagnosis. All 
reviewed proposals deal with the full characterization 
problem with brute force algorithms, with yield unusable 
results (although optimal) for real-life, big rule sets.  
In this paper we take a different approach, proposing 
the design of different, specialized, algorithms for each 
part of the diagnosis problem. 
One of the main contributions has been a complete and 
abstract definition of inconsistency. Based on this 
definition, we revisited the consistency problem in 
firewall rule sets, demonstrating that all relations between 
more than two rules can be decomposed in pair wise 
relations. 
The other major contribution of this paper is the 
proposal of two quadratic algorithms that should be 
applied sequentially to get a diagnosis of the inconsistent 
rules in the rule set. The first one detects and isolates the 
inconsistent rules, and is complete. The second one 
identifies the set of rules that cause the detected 
inconsistencies, and is complete but not minimal. The 
diagnosis can then be taken as input to optimal 
characterization algorithms resulting in an effective 
computational complexity reduction (solving several 
small combinatorial problems is faster than solving one 
big one), or to heuristic ones. The full process has best 
case O(n) and worst case O(n
2
) time complexity with the 
number of rules in the rule set, n. An experimental 
performance evaluation with real rule sets of different 
sizes was also presented, showing that real rule sets are 
very near to the best case, and the effective problem 
reduction.  
However, our approach has some limitations that give 
us opportunities for improvement in future works. The 
most important one is that our process can diagnose 
inconsistent rules, but not redundant rules. Another 
direction to take in the future is the improvement of the 
isolation algorithm, since it dominates the complexity of 
the diagnosis process. 
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